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PROGRESS UNDER LAW
The pathway of the law is the history of civilization. Notwithstanding the contempt for the legal mind, expressed by ir.
Wells, in his "Outline of History," or the jibes of Shakespeare,
Dickens and numerous other men of letters, the material
progress of man finds its highest expression in the law. The
problems of modern society have their basis in social and economic forces. In the solution of those problems the bar is in a
position to render the greatest service in connection -with the
judicial interpretation of the law. Politics is the modus operanW,
or the machinery by which these problems may -be worked out
for the benefit and advancement of mankind. (In Kentucky,
politics might be termed the modus obstructionis.)
WHAT IS THE MISSION OF THE LAW?
The writer likes the English expression" Called to the Bar."
The "call" carries -with it the thought of some mission in life,
beside the obvious necessities of earning a livelihood. To answer the call fills life with a purpose and gives us a high conception of our profession without which the labors of the lawyer
seem to be devoid of any real compensation.
As civilization advances its problems become more and more
intricate. The industrial revolution of 1848 marked the beginning of the great era in which we live. It was the mechanical
genius of man which revolutionized the world's work, cast in
the discard the labor of men's hands, in the individual sense, and
created the demand for organized capital and labor. The combination of these two factors together with the wealth of the land,
constitute the basis of modern society. This is the fact. We can
not turn back. We must accept life as it is and make it as liveable as possible., The individual in such a society as that in
which we live is submerged in the mass. We are but cogs in the
wheels of modern life. The governing motives of men, in peace
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and war, are economic. The contacts of life are increasingly social and less individualistic, less isolated and closer together,
both nationally and internationally. We are the creatures of circumstances -beyond our control, the willing or unwilling victims
of forces, not of our own making, but of mankind as a whole. The
infant industries which sprang up in the reconstruction period
following the Civil War, have now grown hoary with age and
corpulent with profit and power. Under the strain of economic
necessity, hamlets have grown into cities, and cities have grown
into congested communities larger than states in point of population, within the same period. A certain judge on the bench once
remarked that he wished the courts could return to the standards of earlier days and write law after the nobler fashion of
Owsley, Boyle and Robertson. When those great lawyers sat on
the bench Fourth street and Broadway in the City of Louisville
were well on the way, if not actually, out in the country. Today that corner is the center of a circle of but a few miles
in circumference, within which is embraced a population of
nearly 500,000 persons, all of whom must be fed, clothed and
protected from the ravages of crime, poverty and disease, not to
mention the traffic. The expenses of government have increased
from a few millions of dollars annually to figures running into
billions. Statistics on the subject stagger the imagination of all
but mathematicians. Taxes are as certain as death and loom on
our horizon as large as life.
We are told that the life of the nation depends on the unin..
terrupted operation of the railroads. The regulation of commerce over this net work of steel is so stupendous a problem that
were it not for Federal control and supervision life in the great
cities would be impossible within but a few hours. The functions
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, the Revenue Department,
the administration of the pure food and drugs act, and the details with reference thereto, go to make up that new and vast
piece of legal machinery which is termed "administrative law,"
the existence of which the enemies of prohibition are so prone
to condemn as a menace to our "liberties." Administrative law
is novel but necessary. It is in effect a legislative delegation
of the police power. It is the legitimate outgrowth of Marshall's
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constitutional theory of implied power, without which the nation
could not have developed under the Constitution. The nation
would have developed, because economic forces are greater than
political institutions, but the Constitution, strictly construed,
would have passed away. The liberal construction of Marshall
and his illustrious followers on the Supreme Bench has made
possible progress under law. But under this policy the dual
form of our government has undergone great pressure, and with
the coming of the World War the functions of the state governments have been absorbed by the government at Washington to
such an extent that the national capitol casts a mighty shadow
over the states; so much so, that the life of every man, woman
and child in the republic is directly touched by the hand of the
Federal government. The nice distinctions between Federal and
state sovereignty, concerning which constitutional lawyers and
historians have written, volumes are now in many instances
merely academic theories of politics, entirely wanting in practical application.
The fathers of the Constitution were able lawyers and
political students, but under the press of economic and social
forces, which they did not and could not foresee, the political
fabric which they erected, is today threatened with disaster unless the powers of the states and of the Federal government can
be readjusted to meet existing conditions. New definitions must
be arrived at by the courts, whose duty it is to interpret the
fundamental law. The limitations of legislative power must be
carefully scrutinized, in the light of the past, and with a vision
of the future, tempered with an intelligent grasp upon existing
public questions. And so it is that the call to the bar involves a
great mission and requires ability on the part of its members to
think things through to logical conclusions. Successful men of
business are too busy producing these problems to give thought
to their solution. Literary men, scholars, and students in the
arts and sciences, are capable of grasping the nature and causes
of these problems, 'but it remains the task of the lawyers to provide some effective machinery by which government can function
smoothly and in harmony with both the social and economic interests of the nation, among which are finance, banking, public
utilities,.industria]s, agriculture, and indeed all of the various
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factors which keep the wheels of labor and capital in motion.
These are the problems of peace.
Again there is the overshadowing problem of war. With the
sound of shot and shell still ringing in our ears, with over half
the nations of the World War struggling to pay the interest of
their war debts, we still hear talk of the next war. It is for the
lawyers to provide some form of machinery by which the human
race may be saved from self-destruction. The most practical
form of machinery yet devised is the Permanent Court of International Justice known as the World Court. For this reason
we should no longer decline to participate in the labors of that
tribunal under proper reservations.
The young lawyers of today are facing an age of development and progress far beyond the dreams of the fathers of the
republic. As pointed out by Mr. Beck in his recent utterances
on the American Constitution, and by Senator John Sharp
Williams, some years ago, in a series of lectures on Jefferson at
Columbia University, the framers of the Constitution were far
from desiring to effect by that instrument any social or economic
changes differing from the then existing order of English and
Colonial society. The fact is that the Constitution, proper was
so -ultra conservative as to create, as you know, an immediate
popular demand for an abstract declaration of civil and political rights, resulting in the adoption of the first ten amendments.
It is in the concrete application of these amendments to the
various stages of our national development that the conflict between economic and social interest arises, and this is particularly
true of the Fourteenth Amendment with its famous "due process" and "equal protection" clauses. The fathers of the republic, the framers of the Constitution, were, as I have said,
brilliant lawyers, and the glory of their achievement will ever
remain with imperishable lustre upon the pages of history.
Gladstone characterized the Constitution as "The most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose
of man;"'1 but we must not overlook the fact that as that instrument was original, in the sense that it had no political counterpart in the civilized world at the time of its adoption, so it is yet
in its infancy in point of comparative time. It has been characterized by that distinguished lswyer, Lord Birkenhead, as a "conTaylor's Origin and Growth of the Am. Const., p. 18.
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trolled" Constitution, in contradistinction to the "uncontrolled" British Constitution. The one is written, rigid and a
limitation upon legislative power, both present and future, subject to judicial interpretation of the limitation imposed; the
other is unwritten, flexible, and without limitation upon the law
making power. "But the difference between the two constitutions is profound," said Birkenhead in his recent address before
the American Bar Association. "It may ultimately prove to be
a difference altogether creditable to the genius of your forebears." And then his Lordship made this significant observation,
"The last verdict upon this issue will not be pronounced until
your industrial and social questions have reached a longer and.
more sophisticated test." 2 These are the questions of importance
which really most concern the stability and permanence of our
Constitution as an effective instrument of government. Whether
or not the Constitution is sufficiently flexible to meet the tests of
modern society, depends largely on the capacity of the bench
and bar to arrive at sound and intelligent constructions in preference to the process of change by amendment. Judicial interpretation is the safe method, by which our controlled or rigid
constitutions, both Federal and state, can be made living monuments to progress under law, and by which these instruments
may be so shaped and patterned as to become the heritage of the
ages. On the other hand it may be said with reference to the
Federal Constitution that the present desire to legislate by way
of amendment threatens to wreck the whole fabric. A splendid
illustration of this is found in the Child Labor Tax Case3 and
the recently proposed Child Labor Amendment. In the case
referred to Mr. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Supreme
Court of the United States, said:
"The good sought in unconstitutional legislation is an insidious
feature because it leads citizens and legislators of good purpose to
promote it without thought of the serious breach it will make in the
ark of the covenant, or the harm which will come from breaking down
recognized standards. In the maintenance of local self-government,
on the one hand, and the national power, on the other, our country
has been able to endure and prosper for near a century and a half.
"Grant the validity of this law, and all that Congress would need
to do hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control any one of the
great number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which the
2Am. Bar Association Report, 1923, p. 225.
3 259 U. S. 20, 66 L. Ed. 817.
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3tates have never parted with, and which are reserved to them by the
10th amendment, would be to enact a detailed measure of complete
regulation of the subject and enforce it by a so-called tax upon departures from it. To give such magic to the word 'tax' would be to
break down all constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress and
completely wipe out the sovereignty of the states."

Such was the calm and mature 4udgment of the Supreme
Bench. Immediately, Congress, in, order to circumvent this obviously sound conclusion, proposed an amendment permitting
it to "limit, regulate and prohibit the labor of persons under 18
years of age." The amendment failed of ratification, by the
necessary majority of the state legislatures, thus showing an encouraging tendency to abide by the more conservative method of
judicial interpretation in preference to legislative caprice, as
exemplified in the proposed amendment.
-

Before and since the great opinions of Marshall, by which
the power of the Supreme Court and of the courts generally to
disallow legislative act, which in, their judgment contravene
the fundamental law, became a recognized part of our legal system, that power has been the subject of attack. The recent attack
of the late Senator LaFollette in the form of a bill proposing
an amendment limiting the power of the Supreme Court in
this respect, was not a new thing. Senator John Breekinridge, of
Kentucky, in 1802 challenged the power of the court to review
the constitutionality of statutes, and in 1821 it was proposed by
Senator Johnson, of Kentucky, that all cases involving the
validity of state constitutions and statutes the power to review
should be vested in the Senate of the United States, sitting as
an appellate tribunal. The controversy on this subject now
seems to have been set at rest, for the present, when the last
curtain fell upon the dramatic political career of the late Senator from Wisconsin. As in the past the attacks upon this principle will recur, but it will never gain popular favor so long
as the bench and bar continue to keep abreast with the social
and economic development of the nation. In the words of Dean
Pound, "The legal ordering of society is a series of great tasks
of social engineering. The jurist of today is seeking to discover
and ponder the actual social effects of legal institutions and legal
doctrines, and he is indeed a social engineer.'' 4
4Am. Bar Assn. Rep. 1919, pp. 448-449.
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Let us review briefly the labors of lawyers and judges in
"the debatable field of the police power" by way of practical illustration. This power has ever been one inherent in government
and corresponds to the right of self-preservation in the individual. It has been termed "the law of overruling necessity. " 5
It is thus broadly defined by Judge Carroll, writing for the
Court of Appeals in the second workmen's compensation Case:
c
.
the power to regulate and control by legislation all
matters affecting not only the health and the safety, but the general welfare of the people individually as well as in classes into
which they may be reasonably grouped." 6 Police power is "the
name given to that inherent sovereignty which is the right and
duty of the government or its agents to exercise whenever public
policy, in a broad sense, demands, for the benefit of society at
large, regulations to guard its morals, safety, health, order, or
to insure in any respect such economic conditions as an advancing civilization of a highly complex character requires. " 7 According to Mr. Justice Holmes, "It may be said in a general way
that the police power extends to all the great public needs." s
It is to be observed that these definitions have a broader basis
than merely the protection of health, morals and safety.
They include the social welfare and the economic interests of
the nation and this is necessarily so since "the police power is
not a fixed or known quantity, but the expression of social, economic and political conditions. As those conditions vary, the
pclicc power must continue to be elastic and capable of development to meet those changes.'' 9 Progress under law is made
possible by the practical application of these principles to the
life of a free people. On the other hand, the abuse of the power
thus conceded may result in great danger to the constitutional
guaranties of liberty and property, but as said by the Supreme
Court in Munn v. Illinois,10 "That is no argument against its
existence. For protection against abuses by legislatures the
people must resort to the polls, not to the courts." A large
'Ingram v. Colgan, 106 Cal. 113, 46 Am. S. R. 221, 228, 12 C. J.907.
6Greene v. CaldwelZ, 170 Ky. 571, 582.
IStetter v. O'Hara, 60 Ore. 519, :Ann. Cas. 1916A 217.
sNoble State Bank v. H4skell, 219 U. S. 104.
' Freund's Police Power, sec. 3; Carr v. State, 175 Ind. 241, 32 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1190, 1198.
"94 U. S. 113.
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discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine
not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. 1 The
exercise of that discretion, of course, presupposes that the legislature has not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily and it is in the
determination of this condition that the courts have played such
an important part in limiting and releasing the police power.
The decisions of the courts in determining the line of demarcation between what is reasonable and what is arbitrary, in
relation to the exercise of this power, are filled with conflicting
conceptions of economic and social theories and the application
thereto of settled rules of law. The history of these decisions is
the history of social and economic progress. In 1911 the New
York Court of Appeals held the Workmen's Compensation Act
of that state unconstitutional as violating the liberty of contract
as regards both the employer and employe.'12 Subsequently that
court adopted a different view of compensation legislation,"3
4
and three decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,'
together with numerous decisions in the various states,' 5 finally
set at rest all controversy as to the validity of workmen's compensation laws.
Twenty-eight years ago au act of the Utah Legislature fixing
an eight-hour day for workmen in smelters, was sustained by
the Supreme Court as a valid exercise of the police power, in the
leading case of Holden v. Hardy.' At a later day the New
York Court of Appeals sustained an act to regulate the hours of
work for women in factories.' 7 This decision, although based on
considerations of sex, was then thought to be rather advanced,
but this was followed by an opinion of the Supreme Court applying fhe same principle to both male and female workers in
factories, as a health measure.' s The Supreme Court has, with
"Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 136; Holden v. Haray, 219 U. S.
570; Hughes J. in Chicago, Burlington an Quincy R. Co. v. McGuire,
219 U. S. 570.

2 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431.
.Jansenv. Southern Pac. Go., 215 N. Y. 514, 109 N. E. 600.
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New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188; Hawkins v.
Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. .
219.
" Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209; Greene v. Cawell, 170 Ky. 571, Ann Cas. 1918B 611, 615.
1a169 U. S. 366.
"People v. Chas. Sehweinler Press, 214 U. S. 395.
IsBunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426.
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perhaps one exception, 19 uniformly sustained statutes which
regulate hours of labor in industry. On the other hand, in the
Adkins case 20 and the Kansas Industrial Court cases 21 the court
has -consistently refused to extend the police power to include the
compulsory fixing of wages. These cases went off on the theory
that the compulsory fixing of wages is a matter of purely private
concern, i. e., not affected with the public interest, and is, therefore, an invasion of the liberty of contract, but even this position
is not undisputed, for as said by Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Mr.
Justice Holmes, dissenting in the Adkins case, there seems to be
no logical reason why the police power should be construed to inelude statutes regulating hours of labor and to exclude those
regulating payment of wages for labor done. Perhaps this distinction is based on this difference. The regulation of hours is
purely a health measure long ago recognized as a legitimate subject of police legislation. Whereas the regulation of wages can
only rest on the more or less vague, and, perhaps, novel theory,
that the public has an interest in the harmony of capital and
labor, without which production is seriously impaired, as by
boycotts and strikes. The courts have not yet fully recognized
that theory as a proper basis upon which the police power may
operate, and yet it is significant that courts of equity have produced a most strenuous controversy by granting injungtive relief
to organized capital in restraining secondary boycotts'or "sympathetic strikes" involving the same subject, i. e., wages, and apparently on the same broad theory, i. e., that the public interest
was affected. 22 Therefore, where is the distinction, in reference
to the police power, between statutes regulating hours of labor
and payment of wages? Perhaps the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Holmes were right when they intimated that there was
none.
State regulation of so-called public callings found recognition in the law as early as 1683 in the case of Jackson v. Rogers,
wherein Chief Justice, Sir George Jefferies, held that an action
would lie against a common carrier for refusal to carry goods
from London to Lymmington. The carrier was placed on the
"Lochner v. New York. 198 U. S. 45.
2261

U. S. 565.

45 Sup. Ct. 441, 262 U. S. 522.
12Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, Brandeis, Holmes and Clarke,
J. 3., dissenting; 32 C. J. 167.
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same footing with innkeepers and blacksmiths. 23 And the law
on this subject has become firmly established by the statement
of Lord Hale that when private property is affected with a public interest it ceases to be juris privati only. 24 This was the
foundation of the celebrated case of Munn v. Illinois,25 wherein
the power of the Illinois legislature to regulate warehouses
for the storage of grain within the state, and incidentally to
fix by law maximum charges for such storage was sustained as
a valid exercise of the police power. This decision was so sweeping and comprehensive in defining the extent of that power that
the history of railroad regulation, first by the states, then by
joint state and federal control, later by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and now by that commission under the Transportation Act, may be said to have had its inception in Munn v. lii%wis.2 6 As a result of federal control in the matter of uniformity
of intrastate rates, the Railroad Commission of Kentucky, while
preserving its constitutional status, has been largely shorn of
ts powers.2 7 The principle of regulation has subsequently
been extended to include public service corporations generally,
such as telephone and telegraph companies. But it will be
noted that public utilities operate under special franchise
rights and are therefore in the nature of a monopoly. In. return
for special privileges, granted by the state, they come under the
burden of state control, else their operation might become a detriment to the people, instead of a benefit.
The doctrine affirmed in Munn, v. Illinois, and followed by
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky and by courts elsewhere,
namely, that when the owner of property devotes it to a use in
which the public has an interest, he in effect, grants to the
public an interest in that use, and must submit to public control,
for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created,
goes further, in its application, than control of public service
23.Ing's Bench, 2 Shower 332.
De Portibus Maris.
2594 U. S. 113.
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy B. B. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155;
C
Pelc v. Chicago & Northwestern By. Co., 94 U. S. 164; Wabash, etc., R.
Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 569; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Kentucky,
184 U. S. 516; Kentucky Traction & Term. Co. v. Murray, 176 Ky. 601,
195 S. W. 1122; 9 Rose's Notes, U. S. Rep., p. 510, and 2 Supp. 149; Address of Judge R. V. Fletcher, Kentucky State Bar Association Rep.,
1925, p. 113.
2 Houston East & West Texas R. B. Co. v. Unitea States, 234 U. S.
342.
1Hale's
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or franchise corporations. In passing, it is interesting to note
that the Court of Appeals in Nash. v. Page,28 wherein the constitutionality of an act to regulate the sale of leaf tobacco was sustained, did -not regard Munn v. Illinois as a pioneer case.
There are numerous examples of the legitimate regulation
of trades or occupations, which, while private in character, are
quasi-public in operation. Legislation regulating the sale of
leaf tobacco by warehousemen, 2 9 the sale of corporate securities,
commonly known as "blue sky laws "30 the business of plumbers,3 1 of barbers,32 and of real estate brokers,33 has been sustained as within the police power. Referring to this power, in
the King case, the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Clarke, said:
"There is nowhere among free people any doubt of or disposition
to contest the right of the individual to freely contract with reference
to his property, or that this right is fully protected by the state and
Federal Constitutions, but as one individual's absolute right of freedom
in all matters ends where another's begins, it is universally recognized
that in order to secure the right to all and for the common good, the
sovereign state within its indefinable police power may and often must
prescribe reasonable regulations for the exercise thereof."

But notwithstanding all that has been said in favor of its
exercise, still there are limits beyond which the police power
cannot lawfully be invoked. As said by Judge Clay, in the trading stamp case, "When it is sought, not merely to regulate by
reasonable restrictions, but absolutely to prohibit, a particular
business, the act cannot be sustained.''3 4
In 1886 the financial operations of the railroads in combination with the oil trust and other industrial trusts led to the
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission to which Congress delegated sweeping powers in the matter of railroad rates
to which we have already referred. This form of government
control resulted in the adoption of a similar public policy with
respect to all forms of monopoly, as expressed in the Sherman
- 8 0 Ky. 539, 547.
"Note 28, supra.
" King v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 128; Halt v. GeigerJones Co.,
242 U. S. 539.
3City of Louisville v. Coulter, 177 Ky. 242.
" Commonwealth v. Ward, 136 Ky. 146.
2Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U. S. 110; Riley v. Chambers, 185 Pac.
(Cal.) 855; Hoblitzel v. Jenkins, 204 Ky. 122, overruled in Rawles v.
Jenkins, 212 Ky. 287.
"Lawton v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 197 Ky. 394.
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Anti-Trust Act of 1890, and as reinforced by the provisions of
the Clayton Act, the latter being considered one of the outstanding legislative achievements of President Wilson's first administration. The Clayton Act, with its attempted exemption of organized labor from the operation of the anti-trust laws, is illustrative of the conflict between economic and social interest, with
which modern courts and lawyers are forced to deal in connection with injunctions in industrial disputes, already adverted
to.35
Ideas, such as co-operative movements formerly frowned
upon as fanciful and socialistic, have now found sanction in, the
law, as a result of enlightened judicial interpretations. 36 The
law has drifted away from its ancient moorings-the fixed
standards of the Roman law and of the early common lawwhen courts took the view that those standards should be maintained at all hazards, notwithstanding the facts. Today the
courts are seeking intelligently to interpret the law in relation to
cause and effect. This great endeavor has been described by
John W. Davis as "the struggle to translate into law economic
ideas both new and old."
The smoke of battle at the close of the World War lifted as
a curtain upon a new heaven and a new earth. As lawyers we
should, like the spectators at a play, attempt to get a detached
view of this new act in the long drama of history There is
plenty of comedy in the quack remedies of the demagogues and
fanatics. Legislative cures for the ills of society are peddled to
the mob by the bottle like patent medicines. Such are but cheap
and superficial remedies to divert the attention of the public
from the problems of deeper consequence. There are the schemers ad political manipulators who play upon the prejudices and
passions of men. There are the criminals and the nbar criminals,
seeking to plunder, mnurder and rob. In the same scene we can
behold the splendor of great wealth, and the pathos of a poverty
from which there seems to be no release, some living in ease and
luxury, while others exist in the waste places of life, where even
the well of tears has long ago run dry. These are the social inequalities of modern life. The law cannot transform human
I Duplex Go. v. Deering, sup3ra; Lowe v. Lawler, 208 U. S. 274, 52
L. Ed. 488, 235 U. S. 522, 59 L. Ed. 541.
:!Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers' Go-operative Assn., 201 Ky. 441,
447.

PROGRESS UNDER LAW

nature nor remedy all the ills of society, but it can be and has
been so shaped and patterned by the brain, and heart of great
lawyers, that there may be less pain and a more abundant life
among the children of men.
When the Supreme Court announced its decision in Mun*
v. Illinois, the business interests of the nation "viewed with
alarm" the dangerous consequences which might follow, and the
New York Times regarded the decision as "mischievous" and
fraught with danger to the investing public.3 7 You will recall
the long struggle by the government to enforce the Sherman
Act and to "bust the trusts," Air. Chief Justice W-hite's famous
"rule of reason" in the Standard Oil and American Tobacco
cases,38 and President Roosevelt's castigation of the "malefactors of great wealth." When the Supreme Court held valid the
New York and District of Columbia rent laws, and the Adamson
Eight-Hour Law, those who still slept in the peace of the nineteenth century had a rude awakening, when the highest court of
the nation disturbed their cherished notions as to the nature of
property.39 These are the days when such subjects as the socialization of the means of production and distribution are discussed.
During the war the government, in effect, did socialize essential
industries, under the war power. Such a program in times of
peace is incompatible with American legal and political doctrines, and of course absolutely contrary to the existing economic order, but considering the ease and frequency with which
the Constitution has been amended in recent years, the proposal,
however radical, is not impossible. As Disraeli said, "In politics
nothing is impossible." Party government is everywhere showing marked signs of weakness. Blocs, based on economic interest,
are creeping into our political system. We have learned from
experience that conservative opposition, entrenched behind tradition, will not operate as an effective barrier to revolutionary
theories. It is only by liberal interpretations and the free application of the law to the facts of life, as they arise, that unwise
and radical changes may be averted. Extremes may thereby

,New

York Times, March 29, 1877.
221 U. S. 1, 106.
"Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 35; Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256
U. S. 170; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332.
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be made unnecessary if we live in the sunlight of progressive
-hought and breathe the atmosphere of liberal ideals.
As to definite conclusions they are for the courts. It is
merely the function of the lawyer to persuade and to guide
as best he can, in brief and argument, the reasoning of the
judges. But happily it is the genius of the law to expand in
ever widening circles of practical application. As the tides of
the sea ebb and flow through the ages, ever refreshed by streams
of living water, so the law, while embracing the wisdom of the
ages, changes as the tides and is refreshed by streams of human
experience. Such able and distinguished jurists as Air. Justice
Holmes, Judge Cardozo, of the New York Court of Appeals,
Judge Learned Hand, of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and our
own Chief Justice Clarke, have blazed the way. It is for the
young lawyers of today, who will be the judges of tomorrow, to
measure the immensity of the task which lies ahead and to
carry on the great work of progress under law.
On the other hand, the conservative minds have a place in
the profession. It is their influence which makes democracy
safe for the world, but in these days when all of our preconceived
notions as to the nature of personal and property rights have
been revolutionized, I contend that the true conservative is he
who would apply the law to the needs of society, as they arise,
to the end that order may prevail under changing conditions of
life and that the law may be as a lamp to guide the feet of mankind unto the goal of liberty, justice and peace.
GARDNER K. BY~s,
Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky.
Frankfo-t, Ky.

